

25X1 FROM THE DESK OF  
Approved For Release 2006/02/01 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000300100020-9  
[redacted] COMPTROLLER  
U. S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

20 September 1973

Dr. Donald H. Steininger  
Mr. Paul Walsh ✓

*Handwritten: Here To see*

Don/Paul,

Attached is a report to me from one of my troops working the in-house ASD(I) decrement options. If the total figures are to be held at OMB guidance level -- and Bill Colby is committed to present that alternative among others to the President -- then about [redacted] must be found from present requests. (See my memo to you of 17 August 1973).

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The attached is part of that exercise. I've asked [redacted] to seek your help in evaluation of selected parts of the listings.

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[redacted]  
Attachment a/s

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#3

19 September 1973



MEMORANDUM FOR:


SUBJECT : Substantive Impact of Reductions

1. My ASD(I) counterpart and I have so far identified several units and activities within the GDIP/SRV and related non-CDIP programs for consideration as potential candidates for reduction or elimination for the balance of FY 74 or from the FY 75 program. The identification of a unit or activity for this exercise does not imply that we have taken positions contrary to those on which the DCI and the ASD(I) are now on record. Rather, the exercise is intended as an opportunity to surface alternatives for programs and projects that might be delayed or foregone in favor of those of greater priority should significant reductions be forced in Defense intelligence resources. The substantive impact of these reductions in relation to intelligence needs at the national, Departmental, and U&S/component command levels is still in question. We must still identify programs that should be protected or increased as well as alternative and additional units and activities that might be prudently reduced or eliminated. Because of ASD(I)'s schedule for the development of alternative program scenarios for GDIP/SRV, this phase of our task needs to be well in hand by COB 25 September 1973.

2. Units and activities thus far identified are as follows.  
Explanatory comments are theses to be tested.



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b. Air Force Production and associated IDHS. Reduce the 9th RTS, 497th RTG, 548th RTG, 480th RTG, and 544th ARTW to the level at which they are traditionally manned -- 15-20% below authorized end strength.

c. NMIC Improvement. Delay procurement and construction until plans have again been reviewed for relevance to task, relationship to existing capabilities, and the cost-effectiveness of alternatives.

d. HUMINT.



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(2) Consolidate DoD Clandestine and Sensitive HUMINT under a Single Manager for Both Operations and Resources. Resources to support DoD clandestine and sensitive HUMINT assets have been reduced to the point that the Services can no longer afford viable, individual programs. Consolidation under a single manager would provide both personnel and dollar savings and would release for operations personnel spaces now devoted to a variety of duplicating management, support and overhead functions. CIA acceptance of responsibility for support in selected areas of common concern could further reduce non-operational costs and improve the overall efficiency of a DoD clandestine program.

(3) Consolidation of Selected Overt HUMINT Activities. As with clandestine and sensitive HUMINT, savings can be achieved and personnel spaces redirected from management and support to operations by consolidating under a single manager overt HUMINT activities such as foreign document exploitation,

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exploitation of open-source literature, foreign material exploitation, and defector/refugee interrogation -- provided that a capability is retained for the timely return of overt HUMINT assets to the forces they are designated to support for wartime and contingency operations.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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
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k. Fleet Intelligence Support Activities. (There is a question as to whether FISA should compete for resources against national programs or those for the support of the operating forces.)

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3. This internal ASD(I) exercise is being undertaken without the participation of program managers, who are conducting similar exercises of their own. CCG's participation with ASD(I) is an extension of the PDM development process. ASD(I)'s purpose would be defeated if DoD program managers or Service/agency representatives were contacted regarding these speculative and highly controversial strawman candidates. For this reason, any comments that we may have on these units and activities, or on alternatives and additions to them, should be developed and handled as an internal IC Staff matter.



Martin Hurwitz

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